01 · Customer ownership
Gubernix for robotics and uavs.
You build the machine, payload or sensing system. Gubernix provides the operating layer around it, from running applications on the device to updating them, collecting field data and verifying what’s deployed.
Robotics and UAVs · Approved application scope
Example · Robotics and UAVs
Demo data1. Release signed
Payload app v2.4 approved
2. Targeted
One payload application only
3. Boundary held
Flight / motion control untouched
4. Verified
Signature checked, install reported
Select any segment of the ring to see the problem, capability and a demo action.
02 · What scales
What changes when your pilot becomes a fleet?
As you scale, you will need this layer anyway. Drag from pilot to fleet and watch the operating work appear.
- Track installed versions5+ devices
- Approve releases20+ devices
- Manage connectivity loss60+ devices
- Bring field data back150+ devices
- Verify installations300+ devices
Presentation view: the five work items above are the full list at fleet scale.
Build or adopt
| Capability | You may already run | Ongoing maintenance | Where Gubernix slots in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Device inventory and versions | Spreadsheet or internal tool | Medium | Sync from Gubernix fleet view |
| Release approval and targetingAdopt first | Scripts and chat approvals | High | Governed updates |
| Offline buffering and transfer | Custom per product | High | Resilient data transfer |
| Telemetry into your systems | Existing data platform | Low | Keep yours; integrate via APIs |
| Installation evidence | Manual reports | High | Audit records per device |
A credible first step: adopt governed updates for one product line and keep the rest of your stack as it is. Illustrative example.
03 · Relevant workflow
See where Gubernix fits into your system.
Pick the need that matters most to your team.
What it includes
Demo dataGoverned updates
One unit fails a health check after v2.4; it returns to approved v2.3 and is flagged for review.
The field-data loop
Gubernix moves selected field data back and approved models out. Your team owns review, retraining and the release decision.
Hardware integration and deployment prerequisites
- Linux-based compute on the device (ARM or x86); container or native packaging to confirm
- Storage budget for local buffering and an A/B or rollback partition
- Hardware-backed key storage where available (TPM / secure element)
- Clear separation from safety-critical control software
- Network path or controlled transfer process per environment
Approval gate
Release sign-off
Owned by you. Nothing ships without it.
Devices in the field
Gubernix
Selected inputs + outputs
Gubernix
Model review and retraining
Your ML team
Approved model to selected devices
Gubernix
04 · Deployment environment
One update workflow across three operating environments.
Step 1 · Gubernix control plane
Approved release v2.4
Step 2 · On device
Package cached before link drops
Step 3 · On device
Device offline · installs locally
Device offline
Awaiting verification
Step 4 · Device → control plane
Reconnects, reports result
Verified
Evidence path: Result held on device until the next contact. Full sequence shown by default for presentation.
Hosting · to discuss
- ○ Your cloud account
- ○ On-premises
- ○ Managed by Gubernix
Access control · to discuss
- ○ Your identity provider (SSO)
- ○ Role-based approvals
- ○ Site-local operators
Signing-key custody · to discuss
- ○ Your HSM / KMS
- ○ Gubernix-managed
- ○ Offline root, online release keys
Source inspection and MIT licensing: Details once repositories, component boundaries and commercial terms are confirmed
05 · Security evidence
Know which devices are patched and which still need action.
A security campaign, start to finish. Fictional vulnerability in agent v1.8.2.
GX-2026-014 · affects v1.8.2 · fix v1.8.3
Demo dataApproval → first verified
18 min
Coverage
83%
Offline
6
Failed / unverified
1 / 0
Device identity and credentials
Each device holds a unique certificate. Rotate on schedule; revoke a stolen unit and its next connection is refused.
Data protection
TLS in transit. Encrypted at rest on the server and in local buffers where the hardware supports it.
Release integrity
Device checks the signature before install. Failed health check → back to the last approved version.
Audit evidence
Approved by M. Larsen 09:14 · v1.8.3 installed on LD-07 09:32 · verified 09:33.
Proposed: signing-key compromise
Needs validation with Kumar- 1Old release key reported compromised
- 2New key signed by offline root
- 3Trust update reaches each device and is acknowledged
- 4Devices reject packages signed with the old key
Order matters: replacement trust must land before revocation, or offline devices could be stranded.
08 · Pilot
Prove it on one device type.
- 1
Choose an application
- 2
Connect representative devices
- 3
Run an update and recovery exercise
- 4
Review verified results